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)	0,*61	":C;1967) trolley dilemma, a 
thought experiment in which five people are about to be killed by a runaway trolley unless 
action is taken. In the original version, the action involves pressing a 	! to redirect the 
trolley onto a different track where only one person is standing. In an alternative version, the 
action involves pushing a person from a " onto the tracks to stop the trolley 
(Thomson, 1985). Although these dilemmas may seem similar, most people agree to kill one 
to save five in the ‘switch’ version but not in the ‘footbridge’ version. That is, people give 
judgments (do what is best for the majority) for the switch dilemma, but 
 judgments (do not harm others) for the footbridge dilemma (e.g. Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang6Xing, & Mikhail, 
2007). This finding has been replicated for different types of moral dilemmas (e.g. Gold, 
Pulford, & Colman, 2013). Theories have focused on the affective and cognitive processes 
underlying moral judgments (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Moore, Clark & Kane, 
2008).  
A limitation of research on moral judgments in footbridge6 and switch6like dilemmas 
is that it typically recruited undergraduate students with mean ages below 30 years (e.g. 
Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Lotto, Manfrinati, & Sarlo 2013; 
Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Yet, there is evidence of age differences in decision making, 
possibly resulting from age6related changes in affective and cognitive processing (Hess, 
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-=15). Understanding age differences in moral judgment is important 
because older adults occupy some of the highest power positions that involve important 
moral judgments. For example, the average age of current G20 world leaders is 62.1 years, 
and that of Fortune 100 CEOs 57 years (Myatt, 2013). The present study therefore aimed to 
examine whether older and younger adults diverge in their moral judgments and to uncover 
the mechanisms underlying any existing differences.  

 !!"##$ %&
Utilitarian moral judgments, or choices to sacrifice one person to save a larger number 
of people, have typically been attributed to deliberative reasoning (Cushman et al., 2006; 
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Moore et al., 
2008). Indeed, factors that hinder people’s ability to deliberate, such as time pressure and 
cognitive load, generally suppress utilitarian judgments (Greene et al., 2008; Suter & 
Hertwig, 2011). Additionally, utilitarian judgments are more likely when emotional reactivity 
is reduced. For instance, utilitarian judgments are more common among individuals with 
damage in brain regions involved in emotional responsivity (Koenigs et al., 2007); those with 
lower degrees of trait empathy (i.e. the ability to actively consider other’s emotional 
perspectives) (Choe & Min, 2011; Conway & Gawronski, 2013); and those with higher 
degrees of sub6clinical psychopathy, which is characterised by having no empathy for others 
(Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). Presumably, dampened affect yields less 
cognitive6affective conflict about intervening (Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2011). 
Evidence suggests, then, that utilitarian moral judgments are more likely when deliberation is 
engaged, or when emotional reactivity is reduced.  
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)	;'0-=13). Moreover, brain imaging studies have found 
that increased activation in brain areas associated with negative affective states is related to 
more deontological judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 2001, 2004). Recent research has begun to 
shed further light on such effects, determining a key role for emotional (whether the 
emotional experience is positive or negative), as opposed to emotional 	 (the 
magnitude of emotional activation). For example, negatively6valenced affect leads students to 
condemn moral transgressions (e.g. eating your dead dog), independent of arousal (de la 
Viña, Garcia6Burgos, Okan, Cándido, & González, 2015). Instead, positive affect can 
increase utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas such as the footbridge dilemma (Valdesolo 
& DeSteno, 2006). Taken together, these findings suggest that affective reactions with the 
same level of arousal may affect moral judgments differently depending on their valence. 
Specifically, deontological moral judgements may be more likely among individuals who rely 
more on affective rather than deliberative processing – but only if they experience more 
 emotions. Distinguishing these emotional mechanisms is particularly relevant in the 
context of aging, as there is evidence suggesting that younger and older adults differ with 
respect to how arousal (e.g. Kensinger, 2008), and valence (e.g. Leighland, Schulz, & 
Janowsky, 2004) influence affective processing.  
 
%!!!! "#%
Research on judgment and decision making across the lifespan has indicated age6
related shifts in the relative influence of affective and deliberative processes (Hess et al., 
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-=15; Peters & Bruine de Bruin, 2012). Older age has been associated with declines in 
deliberative abilities such as working memory (Reuter6Lorenz & Sylvester, 2005; 
Verhaeghen, Marcoen & Goossens, 1993), executive functioning (Amieva, Phillips, & Della 
Sala, 2003), and processing speed (Salthouse, 2004). Although deliberative abilities tend to 
decline with age, affective processing may improve (Mikels, Larkin, Reuter6Lorenz, & 
Carstensen, 2005). According to research on the affect heuristic, decisions may rely more on 
affect particularly when deliberation becomes difficult, or affective reactions are strong 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Perhaps as a result, emotional cues are more 
likely to be noticed and remembered by older adults (Carstensen & Turk6Charles, 1994; Fung 
& Carstensen, 2003). As compared to younger adults, older adults can also find it difficult to 
resist the effect of affective cues on judgments (Hess, Waters, & Bolstand, 2000). Further, 
while there is contrasting evidence concerning age differences in performance on risky 
decisions for the Iowa Gambling Task (Kovalchik, Camerer, Grether, Plott, & Allman, 2005; 
Mata, Josef, Samanez6Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011), it has been observed that older 
adults rely more on emotional cues for this task whereas younger adults’ performance is 
contingent on their deliberative skills (Wood, Busemeyer, Koling, Cox, & Davis, 2005). 
Additionally, Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen, 2006) posits that older 
adults become especially motivated to maximize their #	 emotional experiences, so as 
to make the best of the limited time they perceive to have left. Older adults may therefore be 
more likely to seek and remember positive than negative information (Mather & Carstensen, 
2005). This so6called ‘positivity effect’ plays a role in a wide range of older adults’ decisions 
(Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Older age has also been associated 
with less neural reactivity to negative stimuli (Wood & Kisley, 2006), and less negative affect 
in the face of adverse experiences (Bruine de Bruin, van Putten, van Emden, & Strough, in 
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0-==1, 2004). Here, we aimed to 
shed light on age6related differences in moral judgments and the underlying role of emotions. 
Across two experiments, we presented older and younger participants with validated moral 
dilemmas. We asked for two moral judgments (following Lotto et al., 2013): whether they 
would intervene to save a larger group of people at the expense of one or two individuals, and 
how morally acceptable they perceived the intervention to be. In both experiments, we also 
assessed participants’ emotional reactions, including valence and arousal (following de la 
Vina et al., 2015, and Lotto et al., 2013). In Experiment 2, we also assessed individual 
differences potentially relevant to age differences in moral judgment.  
Specifically, our research questions were:  
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1. Do older and younger adults differ in their propensity towards deontological versus 
utilitarian moral judgements?  
2. Do older and younger adults differ in their affective reactions when making moral 
judgments?  
3. Are any age differences in moral judgments mediated by age differences in affective 
reactions?  
 
In both experiments we also controlled for sociodemographic factors, given previous 
findings concerning differences in moral judgments contingent upon gender (see Walker, 
2014),  ethnicity (Carlos, Alsua, & Carneiro, 2012), education level (e.g. Pratt, Diessner, 






In Experiment 1 we presented older and younger participants with 26 moral dilemmas 
where peoples’ lives were at stake, taken from Lotto et al. (2013). Half of the dilemmas 
entailed an “instrumental” intervention (i.e., the proposed intervention would cause the death 
of one or two people as an intended means to save a larger number of people) while the other 
half entailed “incidental” interventions (i.e. the proposed intervention would cause their death 
as a foreseen but unintended consequence). Furthermore, half referred to other people as 
beneficiaries of the intervention (“other” dilemmas), and half also benefited oneself (“self” 
dilemmas). Moral judgments and affective reactions can vary across these instrumental 
versus incidental and self versus other dimensions (Lotto et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2008). 
Including dilemmas that varied along those two dimensions allowed us to examine whether 
eventual age6related effects depend on dilemma type.  
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,	150 middle6aged and older adults (55681 years, age=62, $=5.7) 
and 152 emerging younger adults (18625 years, age=22.4, $=1.9), recruited from US 
residents using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They had been screened in an initial 
questionnaire that tested whether they met our age criteria. Although both age groups have 
been characterized in the literature, life6span developmental processes are typically thought 
of as continuous rather than limited to discrete age ranges (Arnett, 2007; Baltes & Smith, 
2003; Lachman, 2004). Yet, extreme age group designs are commonly used to increase 
statistical power (e.g., Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008; Strough, Mehta, McFall, & 
Schuller, 2008). For brevity, we will henceforth refer to the first age group as ‘younger’ and 
the second age group as ‘older’ (following Isaacowitz et al., 2008; Strough et al., 2008). 
The older group comprised 63% females, 55% with University degrees, and 10% non6
Whites. The younger group comprised 64% females, 41% with University degrees, and 20% 
non6Whites. Chi6square tests indicated significant age group differences in having a 
University degree, χ2 (1, %=302)=5.27, #&.032, and ethnic group, χ2 (1, %=302)=5.65, 
#&.042. A chi6square test indicated that Age Group was also marginally6significantly 
associated with political attitude (Left, Centre, Right): χ2 (2, %=302)=5.19, #=.08. Post6hoc 
tests indicated a significant difference in the number of Older adults (%=55) identifying as 
political right6leaning compared to Younger adults (%=35): (300)=2.00, #= .038. All 
analyses for Experiment 1 included dummy variables to control for these sociodemographic 
factors (University Degree: 0=no, 1=yes; Ethnic Group: 0=non6white, 1=white; Politically6
Page 9 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm




































































Right: 0=no, 1=yes.) Participants received $1 for completing the experiment. Those who did 




 # &&,Participants viewed 26 scenarios, including 2 versions of the 
classic trolley scenarios (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985), and 24 taken from Lotto et al. (2013). 
Each scenario described a hypothetical situation in which a number of people would die 
unless an intervention resulted in the death of one or two people. Scenarios were selected 
according to two criteria. First, we selected an equal number of scenarios from Lotto et al.’s 
(2013) four categories, which crossed instrumental versus incidental intervention types with 
self versus other involvement (Table 1). Secondly, within each category, we selected six 
scenarios that yielded good variability in the number of accepted interventions (as reported 
by Lotto et al., 2013). We avoided scenarios for which interventions were accepted or 
rejected by most participants (following Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Full texts for all scenarios, 
and accompanying introductions, are presented in Supplementary Materials. The order of 
presentation of scenarios was randomized across participants.  
 ***Table 1 here*** 
#-$ %&,After each scenario, participants answered two moral judgment 
questions taken from Lotto et al. (2013). The first asked “Would you perform the stated 
action (yes/no).” For each of the incidental/instrumental x self/other dilemma types we 
computed thetotal number of scenarios for which respondents chose to intervene. Totals 
were out of six for Incidental6Self and Instrumental6Self dilemmas (Cronbach’s α=.83, and 
.81 respectively), and out of seven for both Incidental6Other and Instrumental6Other 
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dilemmas (Cronbach’s α=.81, and .80 respectively) on account of the additional trolley 
dilemmas, both Other. The second question asked “How morally acceptable did you find the 
proposed action?” followed by a scale from 1 (“not at all acceptable”) to 7 (“totally 
acceptable”). For each of the four dilemma types, we computed the average rating. 
Cronbach’s alpha for each type of dilemma ranged from .89 to .92. For both measures, higher 
scores reflected more utilitarian and less deontological moral judgments. 
!!,Participants indicated their affective valence and arousal, by respectively 
rating how “calm or agitated” and how “unpleasant or pleasant” they felt “when deciding 
whether or not to do the proposed action in the scenario you just read?” (following Lotto et 
al., 2013). Ratings were given on a pictorial scale of nine figures transitioning along the 
relevant affective dimension (following Bradley & Lang, 1994; Figure 1). For each of the 
four dilemma types, we computed average arousal and valence ratings. For each of the four 
dilemma types, we computed average arousal and valence ratings, as analyses indicated high 
internal consistency (for all, Cronbach’s a ≥ .88). Scores on both affective measures ranged 
from 1 – 9, with higher scores representing more positively6valenced reactions, and higher 
emotional arousal.  
***Figure 1 here*** 
"# $
After reading each moral dilemma, participants clicked a button when ready. The 
proposed intervention was presented on a separate screen, where participants indicated 
whether or not they would perform the action (yes/no). A subsequent screen asked how 
morally acceptable the action was, followed by valence and arousal ratings. No time limits 
were imposed on participants. 
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We conducted 2 (older vs. younger age group) × 2 (instrumental vs. incidental 
intervention type) × 2 (self vs. other risk involvement) ANCOVAs for each of the four 
dependent variables, controlling for sociodemographic differences (education, ethnicity, 
political right). To answer Research Question 1, we examined ANCOVAs for the two moral 
judgment measures. To answer Research Question 2, we examined ANCOVAs for the two 
affect measures. To answer Research Question 3, we performed mediational analyses that 
examined whether any relationships between age group and moral judgment measures could 
be statistically explained by affect measures.  
 
#  #$% $ !!'+#+.#/  ###%$
$&#-$ %&0
+ #. A main effect of age group for total accepted interventions 
indicated that older adults accepted significantly fewer interventions: '(1, 297)=18.73, #
<.001, ηp
2 = .06 (Table 2). There was a significant main effect of intervention type, '(1, 297) 
=12.95, #<.001, with fewer instrumental than incidental interventions accepted (M=5.07, 
SD=4.09 vs. M=7.36, SD=4.11, respectively). All remaining tests yielded '< 2.20, #>.14 
(Table S2, Supplementary Materials). 
#+.-$ %& A significant main effect of age group emerged, 
'(1, 297)=14.12, #<.001, ηp
2=.05, whereby older adults rated interventions as less morally 
acceptable (Table 2). A main effect of intervention type, '(1, 297)=16.52, #<.001, ηp
2
=.05, 
showed lower acceptability ratings for instrumental (M=2.77, SD=1.45) compared to 
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incidental interventions (M=3.22, SD=1.48). All remaining tests yielded '< 1.95, #>.16 
(Table S2, Supplementary Materials). 
 
#  #$% $ !!'!!#/'&1%&#
-$ %&0
 2. A main effect of age group emerged: '(1, 297)=13.11, #<.001, ηp
2 = .04 
with older adults giving lower ratings (indicating more negative affect), as compared to 
younger adults (Table 2). All remaining tests yielded '<1.69, #> .19 (Table S3, 
Supplementary Materials)  
 #$,There was a marginal age group × risk involvement interaction for arousal: 
'(1, 297)=3.69, #&.054, ηp
2=.02. Specifically, moral dilemmas were rated as more arousing 
when the beneficiary included the self, rather than only others. Differences linked to risk 
involvement, however, were small both among younger (Cohen’s =.15) and older adults 
(Cohen’s &.08)1. All remaining tests yielded '<.60, #>.44 (Table S3 in Supplementary 
Materials). 
 
.% !!&#-$ %&&  .% !!!!
#0
Mediational analyses collapsed across instrumental versus incidental intervention type 
and self versus other involvement, because we found no significant interactions between age 
group and these categories.  
***Table 3 here*** 
 

Reported Cohen’s  effect sizes accounted for dependence between variables.
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We first computed partial correlations, controlling for significant sociodemographic 
differences (Table 3). More negative affect (indicated by lower valence scores) was related to 
both moral judgment measures, including (a) accepting fewer proposed actions and (b) rating 
actions as less morally acceptable. Zero6order correlations were similar to partialed 
equivalents (Table S4 in Supplementary Materials). Subsequently, two models examined 
whether relationships between age group and each of the moral judgment measures were 
mediated by age6related variations in affect measures. This line of inquiry followed the 
suggested directionality from affect to moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 
2007). In each model, age group (0=Younger, 1=Older) was the predictor, with affective 
valence and arousal included as mediators. Models controlled for significant 
sociodemographic differences between age groups. We used version 2.13 of PROCESS 
(Hayes, 2013), and generated 95% confidence intervals for indirect effects using 5,000 
bootstrap samples. As noted by Hayes (2013), when bootstrap confidence intervals do not 
contain zero, there is clear evidence that the indirect effect is significant. 
**Figure 2 here** 
+ #,Older adults accepted fewer interventions and exhibited 
more negative affect (seen in lower valence) as compared to younger adults, corresponding 
with ANCOVA results (see Figure 2).2 More negative affect, in turn, predicted fewer 
accepted interventions. The indirect effect of age group on accepted interventions via valence 
was 6.77 (95% CI: [1.60, 6.27])3 Thus, older adults’ stronger negative affect mediated the 
link between older age and fewer accepted interventions. Coefficients for sociodemographic 
covariates indicated significant predictive value for being political right6leaning ((=62.34, 
 

Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Standardized coefficients are available in Supplementary Materials.

All results held when participants who failed an attention check (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014) (%=29) were 
removed from analyses.  
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#=.041), but not for being university educated ((=6.28, #=.737) or ethnicity ((=61.34, #
=.144).   
***Figure 3 here*** 
#+.-$ %&,Older adults also rated interventions as less 
acceptable. More negative affect (seen in lower valence) was associated with lower 
acceptability judgments (Figure 3). The indirect effect of age group via valence was 6.24 
(95% CI: 6.42, 6.12), suggesting that the relationship between older age and lower moral 
acceptability judgments was also mediated by older adults’ stronger negative affect. 
Coefficients for sociodemographic covariates indicated significant predictive value for being 
university6educated ((=.37, #=.044), but not for being political right6leaning ((=6.21, #= 
.282), or ethnicity ((=.05, #=.825).   

$#
Experiment 1 indicated that older adults made more deontological moral judgments 
than younger adults. Specifically, older adults accepted fewer interventions, and rated them 
as less morally acceptable. Older adults also reported more negative affect about moral 
judgments than did younger adults, which accounted for older adults’ greater propensity 
towards deontological moral judgments.  
To our knowledge, this is the first report that affective valence mediates age 
differences in moral judgment. However, other factors could also account for older adults’ 
tendency towards more deontological judgments. For example, older adults may have deficits 
in fluid cognitive ability (e.g. Hess, 2014; Salthouse, 2004), or lack motivation to deliberate 
(measured as Need for Cognition; Bruine de Bruin, McNair, Taylor, Summers, & Strough, 
2015). Older adults also tend to ruminate less (Sütterlin, Paap, Babic, Kübler, & Vögele, 
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2012), which can explain why they are better able than younger adults to cut their losses 
when making decisions involving “sunk costs” (Bruine de Bruin, Strough, & Parker, 2014). 
Older adults may also exhibit more morally idealistic beliefs, reflecting greater concern for 
deontological principles (Carlos et al., 2012; Rawwas & Singhapakdi, 1998). Finally, older 
adults may use a less “rational” style of decision making (Finucane et al., 2002). Because 
each of these individual6differences factors may lead older adults to make more deontological 
moral judgments, we assessed them in Experiment 2.  
Additionally, it is possible that Experiment 1’s findings were limited to moral 
dilemmas involving death. Gold et al. (2013) note that, in terms of emotional severity, “death 
would be at the extreme end of the spectrum, and extreme cases may be treated very 
differently from intermediate ones” (p. 217). Experiment 2 therefore included moral 







Experiment 2 tested the same three research questions as Experiment 1. It involved 
more diverse moral dilemma scenarios that did not exclusively entail the risk of death. It also 




We recruited the same age groups as in Experiment 1, from among US residents on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, including 136 older adults (55675 years, age=60.5, $=4.2) and 
150 younger adults (18625 years, age=22.9, $=1.8). The older group comprised 60% 
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females, 60% had University degrees, and 21% were non6white. The younger group included 
47% females, 43% had University degrees, and 31% were non6white. Chi square tests 
indicated significant age group differences in gender, χ2 (1, %=286)=4.76, #=.040; having a 
University degree, χ2 (1, %=286)=8.14, #&.013; and being religious, χ2 (1, %=286)=24.70, 
#).001. A chi6square test indicated that age group was also significantly associated with 
political attitude (Left, Centre, Right): χ
2
 (2, %=286)=18.73, #&.001. Post6hoc tests indicated 
significant differences in the number of older adults (%=51) identifying as political right6
leaning compared to younger adults (%=23): (284)=4.40, #).001. There was also a 
significant difference in the number of older adults identifying as political left6leaning (%=62) 
compared to younger adults (%=87): (284)=2.81, #<.04. All analyses included dummy 
variables to control for significant sociodemographic factors (Gender: 0=male, 1=female; 
University Degree: 0=no, 1=yes; Religious: 0=no, 1=yes; Politically6Right: 0=no, 1=yes; 
Politically6Left: 0=no, 1=yes). Participant compensation was the same as in Experiment 1.  

 
# &&Participants viewed eight scenarios, including four scenarios from 
Experiment 1 that yielded the largest age6group differences in judgments (Table S1, 
Supplementary Materials). Three additional dilemmas (from Gold et al., 2013) did not 
involve death but rather financial loss (Gameshow), material loss (Rucksack), or 
embarrassment (Sauna). The final non6death scenario from Waldmann and Dieterich (2007) 
involved physical health (Virus). Full texts for all scenarios are presented in Supplementary 
Materials. The order of presentation of scenarios was randomized across participants. 
#-$ %&,These measures were the same as in Experiment 1. For accepted 
actions, Cronbach’s α=.65 across death scenarios, and .44 across non6death scenarios. For 
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average acceptability ratings, Cronbach’s α=.86 across death scenarios, and .62 across non6
death scenarios. 
!!,As in Experiment 1, participants indicated their affective valence and arousal. 
For death scenarios, Cronbach’s α=.87 for both valence and arousal ratings. For non6death 
scenarios, Cronbach’s α=.70 for valence ratings, and .81 for arousal ratings.  

  $4 !!&$, 
$&., We used the four6item Berlin Numeracy test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, 
Ghazal, & Garcia6Retamero, 2012) as a proxy for general cognitive ability (Peters, 2012). 
Numeracy decreases with age (Salthouse, 2012), and is associated with deep elaborative 
processing of information (Cokely & Kelley, 2009) as well as less reliance on irrelevant 
affective cues when reasoning (Peters et al., 2006). Scores could range from 0 to 4, reflecting 
correctly solved items (Cronbach’s α=.84). 
 !##%# An 186item scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) assessed 
motivation to engage in deliberation (e.g. “Thinking is not my idea of fun”). Responses 
ranged from 1 (“Extremely uncharacteristic of me”) to 5 (“Extremely characteristic of me”). 
Higher numbers represented more need for cognition. Need for cognition mediates age 
differences in numeracy performance (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2015). Cronbach’s alpha was 
.93.  
$&#,Eight items from the Disengagement versus Preoccupation subscale of 
the Action Control Scale (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000) assessed ruminative 
thoughts. This subscale has been identified as relevant for understanding age differences in 
responses to adverse events (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014; in press).  Participants were asked 
to imagine how they might feel having made a decision in the scenarios they read, and 
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rated several statements for accuracy. An example item asked “When I’m in a competition 
and lose every time: (a) I can soon put losing out of my mind; (b) The thought that I lost 
keeps running through my mind.”). Ratings ranged from 1 (“Definitely false”) to 5 
(“Definitely true”). Higher scores indicated more ruminative thoughts (Cronbach’s α=.84). 
# & The 106item moral idealism subscale of Forsyth’s (1980) Ethics 
Position Questionnaire measured participants’ deontological moral principles (e.g. “If an 
action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done”). Items ranged from 1 
(“Completely disagree”) to 9 (“Completely agree”). Higher numbers indicated higher moral 
idealism (Cronbach’s α=.90). Rawwas and Singhapakdi (1998) observed significantly greater 
moral idealism in adults (age=56 years) compared to a teenage group (age=19 years), 
suggesting this is a characteristic that strengthens with age. 
#4&1%.,Given the deliberative/affective distinction in moral 
judgments (e.g. Greene et al., 2008), we assessed preferences for deliberative and affective 
decision making, using the Rational (5 items, e.g. “My decision making requires careful 
thought”, Cronbach’s α=.80) and Intuitive subscales (5 items, e.g. “I generally make 
decisions that feel right to me”, Cronbach’s α=.85) of Scott and Bruce’s (1985) Decision 
Making Styles battery. Responses ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly 
agree”), with higher numbers indicating stronger preferences for the decision6making style.  
"# $  
The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to that used in Experiment 1, with the exception 
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1, we examined ANCOVAs for the two moral judgment measures. To answer Research 
Question 2, we examined ANCOVAs for the two affect measures. We also conducted 
ANCOVAs on each individual6differences measure, to examine age differences for each, 
while including the same sociodemographic controls. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics 
concerning these ANCOVAs. To answer Research Question 3, we performed mediational 
analyses that examined whether any relationships between age group and moral judgment 
measures were statistically explained by affect measures while also accounting for individual 
differences.  
 
#  #$% $ !!'+#+.#/  ###%$
$&#-$ %&0
+ #. A significant main effect of age group, '(1, 279)=7.94, 
#&.005, ηp
2
=.03, suggested that older adults accepted significantly fewer interventions (Table 
4).  All remaining tests yielded '<.49, #>.48 (Table S5, Supplementary Materials). 
#+.-$ %&. There was a main effect of scenario type, '(1, 
279)=35.62, #=.006, ηp
2=.11, whereby acceptability ratings were significantly lower for 
death dilemmas (=3.55, $ =1.58) compared to non6death dilemmas (&4.64, $=1.19). 
All remaining effects yielded '<1.17, #>.28 (Table S5, Supplementary Materials). 
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#  #$% $ !!'!!#/'&1%&#
-$ %&0
2. There was a main effect of age group, '(1, 279)=4.24, #=.038, ηp
2
=.02, with 
older adults giving significantly lower ratings (i.e. more negative affect) compared to younger 
adults (Table 4). A main effect of scenario type, '(1, 279)=47.83, #).001, ηp
2=.15, indicated 
more negative affect for dilemmas involving death (=3.15, $=1.71) compared to non6
death dilemmas (=4.78, $=1.28). There was no significant interaction between age group 
and dilemma type, '(1, 279)=1.45, #&.234, ηp
2=.01. 
#$. There was a main effect of scenario type, '(1, 279)=24.21, #<.001, ηp
2=.08, 
with death dilemmas yielding significantly higher arousal ratings than non6death dilemmas 
(Table 4). All remaining effects yielded '<2.81, #>.11 (Table S6, Supplementary Materials). 
***Table 4 here*** 
  $4 !!&$,Age group differences were found in moral 
idealism, '(1, 279)=9.19, #=.018, ηp
2=.03, with older adults (=63.40, $=17.29) reporting 
more morally idealistic views compared to younger adults (=57.61, $=12.78). A 
significant age group difference also emerged for intuitive decision making, '(1, 279)=6.17, 
#=.031, ηp
2=.02, with older adults (=15.23, $=10.29) scoring higher than younger adults 
(=13.99, $&9.58). There were no other significant age differences in individual6
differences measures (all #s>.07). 
.% !!&#-$ %&&  .% !!!!
#0
**Table 5 here** 
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1. Negative valence was related to accepting fewer 
interventions, and rating such interventions as less morally acceptable. Accepting more 
interventions was negatively related with rumination and moral idealism, and positively 
related with intuitive decision6making styles. Zero6order correlations were similar to partialed 
equivalents (Table S7, Supplementary Materials). 
As in Experiment 1, we collapsed across scenarios when conducting mediation 
analyses, because there were no interactions of scenario type with age group. As ANCOVAs 
indicated age differences only for accepted interventions, we confined our mediation analyses 
to this dependent variable. The model was the same as in Experiment 1, with the exception 
that all individual differences measures from Experiment 2 were entered as mediators. 
***Figure 4 here*** 
Age group predicted both the number of accepted interventions and valence, with 
older adults accepting fewer interventions, and exhibiting more negative affect, in line with 
ANCOVA results (see Figure 4). Older age predicted being more morally idealistic, and a 
more intuitive decision maker. As in Experiment 1, negative affect was associated with fewer 
choices to intervene. Additionally, higher moral idealism also predicted fewer interventions. 
We again assessed mediation by generating 95% confidence intervals for indirect effects 
using 5,000 bootstrap samples. There were indirect effects of age group on accepted actions 
via affective valence, 6.09 (95% [CI: 6.26, 6.03]), and via moral idealism, 6.12 (95% [CI: 6.29, 
6.03])
4
. No further factors yielded significant indirect pathways between age group and 
accepted interventions. Coefficients for the sociodemographic covariates in the model 
 

All but one of the reported significant findings (mediation by Valence) remained after removing 42 
respondents who failed an attention check. Removing these participants likely reduced the statistical power to 
detect this effect, which was small for the full sample.    
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;(R6014, #&.942), being political right6leaning ((=6.18, #=.674) or left6leaning ((=6.28, 
#=.344), or being university6educated ((=.04, #=.861).   

$#
Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 indicated that older adults were more morally 
deontological than younger adults. Older adults again accepted fewer interventions. The trend 
for moral acceptability judgments also followed that reported in Experiment 1, where older 
adults gave lower acceptability ratings, although differences in Experiment 2 were not 
significant. In line with Experiment 1, we also found that older adults experienced more 
negative affect when making moral judgments, and that such affective differences mediated 
the link between age and accepted interventions. It should be noted, however, that the 
mediating effect of negative affect in Experiment 2 was weaker than in Experiment 1. 
Additionally, in Experiment 2 we found that age differences in moral judgments are also due 
to older adults holding more morally idealistic principles. Results held when controlling for a 
range of relevant individual6difference measures, as well as sociodemographic factors that 
varied with age.  
Interestingly, we found no significant age differences in deliberative capacities such 
as numeracy, rational decision style, or need for cognition. Possibly, our older respondents 
were of above6average ability, with 60% reporting university degrees (compared to US 
national average of 45%, Ryan & Bauman, 2016). Additionally, the Berlin Numeracy Test in 
particular tends to yield positively6skewed distributions in Mechanical Turk samples (e.g. 
Cokely et al., 2012). Indeed, 80% of our sample were unable to answer more than 50% of the 
items correctly, which may have tempered our ability to detect age differences in numeracy. 
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"*>;-=13), could be that the 
deontological influences of negative affect, and moral idealism, are triggered by the idea of 
harm itself, rather than by the specific form or severity of harm. However, the finding that the 
mediating effect of negative affect was weaker in Experiment 2 (vs. Experiment 1) suggests 
that the size of this effect may depend to some extent on scenario extremity. Future work 





Taking cue from moral judgment research indicating associations between affective 
processing and deontological moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001; 2004), and from lifespan 
developmental research observing greater reliance on affect in the decision making of older 
adults (e.g. Carstensen, 2006), we investigated age differences in moral judgments and their 
underlying affective mechanisms. In two experiments, older adults made more deontological 
judgments than younger adults, which was accounted for by older adults’ more negative 
affective reactions. In Experiment 2, the link between age and moral judgments was also 
accounted for by older adults’ more morally idealistic principles.  
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-==1, 2004, 2009), whereas positive affect can instead lead to more utilitarian judgments 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). Across two experiments, we observed that older adults’ 
increased propensity for deontological moral judgments could be statistically explained by 
their more negative affective reactions. Affective factors may play a larger role in both 
deontological and utilitarian moral judgments than previously considered (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Duke & Begue, 2015; Kahane et al., 2015).  
Our finding that affect is relevant for understanding age differences in moral 
judgment dovetail with lifespan developmental studies that highlight older adults’ increased 
reliance on affect (e.g. Mikels et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2005). Such research has also shown 
that older adults are to act in situations involving sunk cost decisions (e.g. Bruine 
de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014). This implies that it is 
unlikely that older adults’ increased propensity for deontological judgments merely reflects a 
general tendency towards inaction.    
The psychological aging literature also suggests older adults experience a “positivity 
effect” (e.g. Carstensen, 2006), and exhibit less neural reactivity to negative stimuli (Wood & 
Kisley, 2006). Our findings indicate that moral judgments may be a special case of especially 
adverse negative stimuli, however, where older adults experience responsivity 
(Charles, 2010).  As moral dilemmas are designed to evoke strong negative affect, we assume 
that such dilemmas trigger an affect heuristic (Slovic, et al., 2002) that influences subsequent 
judgments. Other research has shown that older adults, when faced with more negative 
emotional stimuli, engage more automatic cognitive processes (Sanda Dolcos, Katsumi, & 
Dixon, 2014). Our findings demonstrate that, in the context of moral judgments, older adults’ 
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0-==1, 2004).  
Relatedly, Hess et al. (2000) report that older adults struggle to disregard affective 
cues when making judgments. For moral judgments, then, older adults’ greater negative 
affect could drive them towards deontological responses. It may be that older adults choose a 
deontological course of action (i.e. notintervening) as a means of avoiding further negative 
feelings associated with sacrificing an individual by intervening (e.g. Lotto et al., 2013). 
Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, and Wilson (2006) have indicated that older adults tend to 
distinctly avoid negative stimuli if they can. Moral dilemmas, however, generally task people 
with choosing between two upsetting courses of action. In such a context, if older adults’ 
behaviors are motivated towards maximizing positive affect (Carstensen, 2006), then a 
deontological response may be their best option.   
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-=11). Older adults’ more saliently negative affective 
reactions to moral choices may reinforce this preference. Another interesting question relates 
to the robustness of the mediating role of affective reactions. As noted earlier, this mediating 
effect was weaker in Experiment 2, which included moral dilemmas that involved potential 
harms, albeit not always as aversive as the risk of death. Future research could examine age6
related differences in moral judgments and affective reactions in response to scenarios that 
differ in context and aversiveness. 

  ###%$ %& %$## & 
 Our findings also revealed that that older adults’ moral principles were more strongly 
characterized by morally idealistic thinking (see Carlos et al., 2012; Hannikainen et al., 2018; 
Rawwas & Singhapakdi, 1998), which in turn also accounted for age differences in moral 
judgment. An idealistic perspective places greater weight on strict adherence to societally6
defined codes (e.g. “If an action could ! an innocent then it should not be done”, Forsyth, 
1980). In such light, older adults’ relative focus may be on the individual who will be 
harmed, rather than on the aggregate benefit of intervening. Older adults may be less willing 
to contravene these stronger idealistic beliefs, which manifests as a deontological decision to 
not intervene.  
Upholding the authority of law represents a further cornerstone of moral idealism. Ma 
(1985) reports that older adults are less willing to break the law to benefit strangers than they 
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>	0B0;-=13) Moral Foundations Theory. However, 
it has yet to be established whether these foundations vary with age. Assessing how older and 
younger adults differ in moral foundations concerning harm and authority could further 
identify the specific idealistic moral beliefs that may drive younger and older adults to differ 
in their moral decisions.  

&# $$'
 Like any study, ours is subject to limitations that might be addressed by future 
research. Firstly, given our cross6sectional design, it is possible that the age differences 
reported may reflect a cohort effect driven by generational differences	see Hannikainen et 
al., 2018). While a longitudinal study of moral reasoning would of course be ideal, 
experimental priming manipulations could also offer further substantiations of the current 
findings. For example, evidence suggests that younger adults can be primed to respond like 
older adults through manipulating time horizons (Strough, Schlosnagle, Karns, Lemaster, & 
Pichayayothin, 2014). 
Secondly, owing to general limitations of Mechanical Turk samples (Ipeirotis, 2010), 
our older groups reported higher levels of University level education compared to the US 
population (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). Yet, our finding that older adults still made 
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1;00	0-=17) and more outright measure of deliberation 
such as reaction times (see Ghazal, Cokely, & Garcia6Retamero, 2014). 
Finally, follow6up work should also explore whether younger and older adults 
experience different discrete emotions when faced with moral dilemmas. While disgust is an 
emotion related specifically to deontological moral judgments (e.g. Ugazio et al., 2012), there 
is also evidence that older adults experience less disgust (Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, & 
Levenson, 2005), but more sadness (Kunzmann & Grühn, 2005). More nuanced assessments 
of both deliberation and emotional responses would allow building a more comprehensive 
model of the factors that can account for age6differences in moral judgments, beyond the 
ones documented in the current work.     
 
  
Page 29 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm














































































Arnett, J. J. (2007). Emerging adulthood: What is it, and what is it good for?. *!
##	#	, -(2), 68673. 
Baltes, P. B., & Smith, J. (2003). New frontiers in the future of aging: From successful aging 
of the young old to the dilemmas of the fourth age. ., /0(2), 1236135. 
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1994). Measuring emotion: The self6assessment manikin and 
the semantic differential. (!1!#2#3	!, 
4+(1), 49–59.  
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A.M., & Fischhoff, B. (2012). Explaining adult age differences 
in decision6making competence. (!	4+(4), 3526
360. 
Bruine de Bruin, W., Strough, J., & Parker, A. M. (2014). Getting older isn’t all that bad: 
better decisions and coping when facing “sunk costs”. 3	!, 40(3), 
642–7. 
Bruine de Bruin, W., McNair, S. J., Taylor, A. L., Summers, B., & Strough, J. (2015). 
“Thinking about numbers is not my idea of fun”: Need for cognition mediates age 
differences in numeracy performance. 	, ,+(1), 22626. 
Bruine de Bruin, W., van Putten, M., van Emden, R., & Strough, J. (In press). Age 
differences in emotional responses to monetary losses and gains. 3	!. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for 
cognition. 3					, /5(2), 3066307. 
 
Page 30 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm




































































Carlos, J., Alsua, C. J., & Carneiro, J. (2012). Moral philosophies and ethics across borders : 
A study of Brazil, Chile, China, Estonia and the United States. 6	
7	/030644. 
Carstensen, L. L. (2006). The influence of a sense of time on human development. $
8%9% 9 :, ,-4(5782), 1913–5.  
Carstensen, L. L., & Mikels, J. A. (2005). At the intersection of emotion and cognition: 
Aging and the positivity effect. *	#	!	, -/(3), 1176
121. 
Carstensen, L. L., & Turk6Charles, S. (1994). The salience of emotion across the adult life 
span. 3	!, 0(2), 259–264.  
Charles, S.T. (2010). Strength and Vulnerability Integration (SAVI): A model of emotional  
well6being across adulthood. 3	!(, -,;(6), 106861091. 
Choe, S. Y., & Min, K. (2011). Who makes utilitarian judgments? The influences of 
emotions on utilitarian judgments. 	, ;(7), 580–592.  
Cokely, E. T., & Kelley, C. M. (2009). Cognitive abilities and superior decision making 
under risk : A protocol analysis and process model evaluation. 	
, /(1), 20–33. 
Cokely, E., Galesic, M., Schulz, E., Ghazal, S., & Garcia6Retamero, R. (2012). Measuring 
risk literacy: The Berlin numeracy test. 	, <(1), 25–47.  
Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013). Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral 
decision making: a process dissociation approach. 3	$
3	!, -=/(2), 216–35.  
 
 
Page 31 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm



















































































de la Viña, L., Garcia6Burgos, D., Okan, Y., Cándido, A., & González, F. (2015). 
Disentangling the effect of valence and arousal on judgments concerning moral 
transgressions. 1!$#	!3	!, -5, 1–9. 
Del Missier, F., Hansson, P., Parker, A.M., Bruine de Bruin, W., Nilsson, L.G., & Mäntylä, T 
(2017). Unraveling the aging skein: Disentangling the effects of sensory and cognitive 
predictors on decision making. (!	,=(1)1236139  
Depping, M. K., & Freund, A. M. (2011). Normal Aging and Decision Making: The Role of 
Motivation. >#, +/(6), 349–367. 
Diefendorff, J. M., Hall, R. J., Lord, R. G., & Strean, M. L. (2000). Action6state orientation: 
construct validity of a revised measure and its relationship to work6related variables. 
##3	!, 5+(2), 250–263. 
Duke, A. A., & Bègue, L. (2015). The drunk utilitarian: Blood alcohol concentration predicts 
utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas. *, -,/, 121–127. 
Finucane, M. L., Slovic, P., Hibbard, J. H., Peters, E., Mertz, C. K., & MacGregor, D. G. 
(2002). Aging and decision6making competence: An analysis of comprehension and 
consistency skills in older versus younger adults considering health6plan options. 
(!	, -+(2), 141–164. 
Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. ?2
6, (5), 5–15. 
Forsyth, D. R. (1980). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. 3	$
3	!, ,0(1), 175–184. 
Page 32 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm

















































































Ghazal, S., Cokely, E. T., & Garcia6Retamero, R. (2014). Predicting biases in very highly 
educated samples: Numeracy and metacognition. 	, 0(1), 
15. 
Gold, N., Pulford, B. D., & Colman, A. M. (2013). Your money or your life: Comparing 
judgements in trolley problems involving economic and emotional harms, injury and 
death. 	3!	#!, 40(2), 213–233. 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). 
Moral Foundations Theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. In P. Devine & 
A. Plant (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 47, pp. 55–130). San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. a, Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive 
load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. *, -=<(3), 1144–54. 
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural 
bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. %, //, 389–400. 
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An 
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. $, 40,(5537), 
2105–2108. 
Hannikainen, I. R., Machery, E., & Cushman, F. A. (2018). Is utilitarian sacrifice becoming 
more morally permissible? *, -<=, 956101. 
Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Kang6Xing, J., & Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation 
between moral judgments and justifications. @7, 44(1), 1–21. 
Page 33 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm





































































		 New York: Guilford Press. 
Hess, T. M. (2014). Selective engagement of cognitive resources: Motivational influences on 
older adults’ cognitive functioning. 3	#	3	! $, 0(4), 388–
407. 
Hess, T. M., Waters, S. J., & Bolstad, C. A. (2000). Motivational and cognitive influences on 
affective priming in adulthood. 	.$	(
3	!
$	$$	, ++(4), P1936P204. 
Hess, T.M., Strough, J., & Lockenhoff, C.E. (Eds.). (2015). 	

###3	#	 London, UK: Academic Press. 
Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Analyzing the amazon mechanical turk marketplace. A6$

*			1!*B$	, -<(2), 16621. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., Toner, K., Goren, D., & Wilson, H. R. (2008). Looking while unhappy: 
Mood6congruent gaze in young adults, positive gaze in older adults. 3	!
$, -0(9), 8486853. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., Wadlinger, H. A., Goren, D., & Wilson, H. R. (2006). Selective 
preference in visual fixation away from negative images in old age? An eye6tracking 
study. 3	!, 4-(1), 40. 
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Farias, M., & Savulescu, J. (2015). “Utilitarian” 
judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater 
good. *, -,/, 193–209.  
Kensinger, E. A. (2008). Age differences in memory for arousing and nonarousing emotional 
words. 1!	.$	(
3	!$	$
$	, ;,(1), 13618. 
Page 34 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm


























































































090;-=11). Utilitarian moral judgment in 
psychopathy. $	, <(6), 7086714.Kunzmann, U., 
& Grühn, D. (2005). Age differences in emotional reactivity: the sample case of sadness. 
3	!, 4=(1), 47–59. 
Kovalchik, S., Camerer, C. F., Grether, D. M., Plott, C. R., & Allman, J. M. (2005). Aging 
and decision making: A comparison between neurologically healthy elderly and young 
individuals. (!?B, +5(1), 79–94.  
Kunzmann, U., Kupperbusch, C. S., & Levenson, R. W. (2005). Behavioral inhibition and 
amplification during emotional arousal: a comparison of two age groups. 3	!
, 4=(1), 144–158. 
Lachman, M. E. (2004). Development in midlife. 63	!, ++, 3056331. 
Leigland, L. A., Schulz, L. E., & Janowsky, J. S. (2004). Age related changes in emotional 
memory. %", 4+(8), 111761124. 
Lotto, L., Manfrinati, A., & Sarlo, M. (2013). A New Set of Moral Dilemmas: Norms for 
Moral Acceptability, Decision Times, and Emotional Salience. (!
	, 4<(1), 57–65. 
Ma, HK, (1985). Cross6cultural study of the development of law6abiding orientation. 
3	!6#	+<(3), 9676974. 
Page 35 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm






































































>0&0E 	,&0;-=11). Age differences in 
risky choice: A meta‐analysis. 	!%9$	, -4,+(1), 
18629.  
Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2005). Aging and motivated cognition: The positivity effect 
in attention and memory. 1			, 0(10), 4966502. 
Mikels, J. A., Larkin, G. R., Reuter6Lorenz, P. A., & Carstensen, L. L. (2005). Divergent 
trajectories in the aging mind: Changes in working memory for affective versus visual 
information with age. 3	!, 4=(4), 542–553. 
Moore, A. B., Clark, B. a, & Kane, M. J. (2008). Who shalt not kill? Individual differences in 
working memory capacity, executive control, and moral judgment. 3	!
$, -0(6), 549–57. 
Myatt, M. (2013). %'-==*?$ Retrieved from: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemyatt/2013/08/13/infographic6dna6of6fortune61006
ceos/ 
Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006). 
Numeracy and decision making. 3	!$, -<(5), 407–13. 
Peters, E. (2012). Beyond Comprehension: The Role of Numeracy in Judgments and 
Decisions. *	3	!$, 4-(1), 31–35.  
Peters, E., & Bruine de Bruin, W. (2012). Aging and decision skills. 	
		
7#, +, 11361139. 
Piazza, J., & Sousa, P. (2014). Religiosity, political orientation, and consequentialist moral 




Page 36 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm







































































	00;1996). Moral and 
social reasoning and perspective taking in later life: A longitudinal study. 3	!
, --(1), 66. 
Rawwas, M. Y. A., & Singhapakdi, A. (1998). Do Consumers’ Ethical Beliefs Vary with 
Age? A Substantiation of Kohlberg’s Typology in Marketing. 
1!3, ;(2), 26–38. 
Reuter6Lorenz, P. A., & Sylvester, C. Y. C. (2005). The cognitive neuroscience of working 
memory and aging. In R. Cabeza, L. Nyberg, & D. Park (Eds.),*%	

7**"(pp. 1866217). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ryan, C. L., & Bauman, K. (2016). Educational attainment in the United States: 2015 (United 
States Census Bureau Publication No. P20–578). Washington, D.C.: US Government 
Printing Office. 
Sanda Dolcos, Y. K., & Dixon, R. A. (2014). The role of arousal in the spontaneous 
regulation of emotions in healthy aging: a fMRI investigation. '	#	!, 
+. 
Salthouse, T. A. (2004). What and When of Cognitive Aging. *	
3	!$, -,(4), 140–144. 
Salthouse, T.A. (2012). Consequences of age6related cognitive declines. 6
3	!, ;,, 2016226. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). Rational Actors or 
Rational Fools? Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral Economics. In T. 
Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.)  >		(		
1!3	!
 (pp. 397–420). Boston: Cambridge University Press. 
Page 37 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm







































































0;-=14). No time to 
waste: Restricting lifedspan temporal horizons decreases the sunkdcost fallacy. 
(!	, 4<(1), 78694. 
Strough, J., Mehta, C. M., McFall, J. P., & Schuller, K. L. (2008). Are older adults less 
subject to the sunk6cost fallacy than younger adults?. 3	!$, -0(7), 6506
652. 
Suter, R. S., & Hertwig, R. (2011). Time and moral judgment. *, --0(3), 454–8.  
Sütterlin, S., Paap, M. C. S., Babic, S., Kübler, A., & Vögele, C. (2012). Rumination and age: 
some things get better. 6	!, 4=-4, 2676327.  
Torges, C. M., Stewart, A. J., & Nolen6Hoeksema, S. (2008). Regret resolution, aging, and 
adapting to loss. 3	!, 4,(1), 169. 
Thomson, J. J. (1985). The Trolley Problem. 97, 0/(6), 139561415. 
Ugazio, G., Lamm, C., & Singer, T. (2012). The role of emotions for moral judgments 
depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario. , -4(3), 579. 
Verhaeghen, P., Marcoen, A., & Goossens, L. (1993). Facts and fictions about memory and 
aging: a quantitative integration of research findings. Journal of Gerontology, 48,1576
171. 
Waldmann, M. R., & Dieterich, J. H. (2007). Throwing a Bomb on a Person versus Throwing 
a Person on a Bomb: Intervention Myopia in Moral Intuitions. 3	!$, 
-5(3), 247–253. 
Walker, L. J. (2014). Sex differences in moral reasoning. In W.M. Kurtines & J.L. Gewitz 
(Eds.), >""!# (pp. 3336364). New York: 
Psychology Press.  
 
Page 38 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm

























































































Page 39 of 83
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bdm





































































%#. # &&# "#+# #
Incidental, Self You are a fireman trying to save five 
people from inside a burning building. 
The only window from which the 
people can be evacuated is jammed and 
will not open. The fire will reach you in 
a short time. Outside on the window 
ledge of the floor below there is a 
person who is waiting to be saved.
With an axe you smash the window to 
get out. You know that when it falls, 
the heavy glass will kill the person on 
the lower floor, but you and the five 
people in danger will be able to 
escape.
Instrumental, Self You are travelling in the middle6east. 
You and another six tourists are taken 
hostage by a group of terrorists. The 
terrorists think that one of you is a spy, 
even though this is not true. You are 
held hostage for days. One of the 
terrorists comes to you and reveals that 
they intend to kill you all at sunset.
While he is resting, you kill one of the 
tourists in the group so that you can 
tell the terrorists that you identified 
and eliminated the spy. The person 
will die, but you and the other five will 
be freed.
Incidental, Other You are a nurse who is in charge of a 
machine which controls drug dosage 
levels in patients’ blood. Because of a 
technical failure, the machine is 
supplying a lethal dose of a drug to four 
patients. Another patient, in a single 
room, is hooked up to the same machine 
and has not undergone any variation in 
dosage.
You press the button to block the drug 
supply to the four patients. You know 
that the overdose of drug will be 
redirected to the patient in the single 
room, who will die, but the other four 
will be saved.
Instrumental, Other You are the head zoo keeper and you 
are doing the rounds with another 
keeper. You realise that one of the 
cleaners has left the lions’ cage open by 
mistake. You see that a lion is coming 
towards the open gate and you do not 
have time to close it. There are three 
visitors right in front of the gate.
You push the keeper next to you 
against the gate to stop the lion getting 
out. You know that the man will be 
attacked and killed, but the three 
visitors will be saved.

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        Table 2: 	8$	:		"#	#2#- 
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 Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
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 1 2 3 4
Moral judgment    
1. Accepted interventions          66   
2. Moral acceptability .56***          66  
Affect    
3. Valence .18** .28***           66 
4. Arousal .07 .10 6.52***        66
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Moral judgment          
1. Accepted interventions 66         
2. Moral acceptability  .44*** 66        
Affect          
3. Valence .23*** .49*** 66       
4. Arousal .19** .14* .02 66      
Individual differences           
5. Need for cognition 6.12 .01 6.1 .03 66     
6. Rumination 6.16** 6.25*** 6.37*** .07 6.05 66    
7. Numeracy 6.09 6.01 6.16* 6.14* .19** .03 66   
8. Rational decision style 6.03 6.07 6.17** .14* .17** .12* .05 66  
9. Intuitive decision style .17** .08 .09 .14* 6.10* 6.05 6.25*** .09 66 
10.Moral idealism 6.14* 6.12 .06 .18** 6.02 .02 6.18** .20** .17** 66
*=#<.05, **=#<.01, ***=#<.001.  
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